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Background and Aims: The cognitive models indicate that people with social phobia and
paranoia share a common fear of others. While we recognize clinical differences, it is
likely that some of the same psychological processes contribute to the maintenance of both
presentations, yet the nature and extent of these similarities and differences are not yet
clearly understood. This study explored threat experiences in people with social phobia and
persecutory delusions in order to elucidate these aspects of the respective cognitive models.
Method: Accounts of interpersonal threat experiences were examined in nine people with
social phobia and nine people with persecutory delusions. Verbatim transcripts were analyzed
using thematic analysis. Results: Three major themes emerged from the data: participants’
experience of threat, reactions while under threat, and subsequent reflections. Narrative
coherence emerged as a superordinate theme. Typical fear responses were found in both
groups, particularly in their reactions to threat. The key differences were in participants’
perceptual experiences, ability to stand back from the threat following the event, and narrative
coherence. Conclusions: The findings are discussed in relation to current cognitive models
of social phobia and paranoia. Theoretical and clinical implications are drawn out, and
highlight the need to examine attentional and metacognitive processes more closely if we are
to understand the maintenance of perceived threat in these groups, and means of alleviating
associated distress.
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Introduction
The current cognitive models indicate that interpersonal threat beliefs are a key component of
both social phobia (Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997) and paranoia (Bentall,
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood and Kinderman, 2001; Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994;
Freeman and Garety, 2000; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler and Bebbington, 2002; Gumley
and Schwannauer, 2006; Trower and Chadwick, 1995). Social phobia is the fourth most
Reprint requests to Katherine Newman Taylor, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton
SO14 1BJ, UK. E-mail: knt@soton.ac.uk
© British Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies 2012
Interpersonal threat in social phobia and paranoia 189
common psychiatric disorder (Kessler et al., 2005). The presentation is characterized by a
fear of humiliating or embarrassing the self in social situations; in other words an intense
fear of negative evaluation, leading to anxiety and avoidance of social situations (Clark and
Wells, 1995). Paranoia refers to beliefs ranging from social evaluative concerns through to
persecutory delusions in which the person fears intended physical, social or psychological
harm to themselves (Freeman and Garety, 2000; Freeman et al., 2005). A key difference
in the cognitive models, then, is the distinction between negative evaluation and intended
harm. Although this is quite clear in theory, this is not always the case in clinical settings, for
example in conceptualizing pervasive fears that go beyond negative evaluation to beliefs that
others are bullying or humiliating the person.
In addition to the overlap in the content of threat beliefs, it is likely that similar
psychological processes contribute to the maintenance of social phobia and paranoia (see
Freeman et al., 2002, following Clark, 1999). This is supported indirectly by the co-morbidity
literature in which social phobia has repeatedly been identified as a risk factor for a diagnosis
of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Cossoff and Hafner, 1998; Michail and Birchwood,
2009; Olin and Mednick, 1996).
Despite similarities in the content of cognition, and evidence of an epidemiological
relationship, we know clinically that we can usually distinguish these presentations. However,
the nature and extent of the similarities and differences between the two are not yet
fully understood in psychological terms. This is important because cognitive behavioural
interventions depend on clear and accurate formulation of the experience and maintenance of
distress, and so a detailed understanding of these processes is essential to effective therapeutic
work. This study examines the lived experience of people with social phobia and people with
persecutory delusions in feared situations in order to elucidate the experience of interpersonal
threat in each group.
Problems of interpersonal threat: the cognitive models of social phobia and paranoia
Current cognitive models assume that people with social phobia hold beliefs about the self
as flawed (e.g. “I’m weird,” “I’m odd”, “I don’t fit in” and “I’m not like other people”)
which are activated in social situations, and trigger anxiety (Clark and Wells, 1995; Hofmann,
2007; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). Clark and Wells (1995) emphasize unrealistic standards
for social performance, for example “I must look completely confident at all times”, as
well as catastrophic beliefs about failing to achieve these expectations such as “they won’t
want to know me”. Once these beliefs and assumptions have been activated, a series of
inter-linked psychological processes maintain the anxiety, including streams of automatic
thoughts about performance and the self (e.g. Norton and Hope, 2001, Rapee and Lim,
1992; Stopa and Clark, 1993), avoidance and safety behaviours that prevent disconfirmation
of beliefs, and interpretational (Amir, Foa and Coles, 1998; Stopa and Clark, 2000) and
attentional processes (Amir, Freshman and Foa, 2002; Pishyar, Harris and Menzies, 2004;
Spector, Pecknold and Libman, 2003). The Clark and Wells model emphasizes the central
role of self-focused attention leading to intense self-consciousness, resulting in the individual
focusing on the content of consciousness in which the feared representation of self is often
manifest as an image of the person seen from an observer perspective (Hackmann, Surawy
and Clark, 1998; Hackmann, Clark and McManus, 2000), for example shaking violently
or stuttering uncontrollably. This image, based on subjective feelings of anxiety, maintains
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the fear of negative judgments by other people because the person assumes that this is what
other people actually see. The internal focus on the self may also be linked to characteristic
patterns of behaviour in social phobia such as avoidance of eye contact (Horley, Williams,
Gonsalvez and Gordon, 2004), which may represent a strategy aimed at preventing other
people from noticing, and therefore negatively evaluating the individual. However, this
attentional strategy is counter-productive because it prevents individuals from obtaining data
that might disconfirm their beliefs about other people’s negative judgments.
Cognitive models of paranoia (Bentall et al., 2001, 1994; Freeman et al., 2002; Trower
and Chadwick, 1995) also assume that problematic core beliefs about the self (that may
or may not reach conscious awareness, following Trower and Chadwick, 1995), and about
others, contribute to an enduring vulnerability to paranoia (Fowler et al., 2006; Moorhead,
Samarasekera and Turkington, 2005; Rector, 2004).
In arguably the best evidenced of these models, Freeman et al. (2002) propose that for
vulnerable individuals, stressful situations trigger arousal and generate anomalous cognitive
experiences, such as thoughts being heard as voices and actions experienced as unintended.
The paranoid belief is reached as an attempt to make sense of these experiences. As in
social phobia, cognitive biases and behavioural responses then maintain the belief through
a combination of confirmatory and disconfirmatory processes (following Clark, 1999). These
include anxiety driven avoidance and other safety behaviours (Freeman, Garety and Kuipers,
2001), selective attention (Bentall, Kaney and Bowen-Jones, 1995; Fear, Sharp and Healy,
1996) and interpretational biases (Bentall, Kaney and Dewey, 1991; Frith, 1992; Garety,
Hemsley and Wessely, 1991).
A hierarchy of interpersonal threat beliefs
Perhaps the clearest account of the range of interpersonal threat beliefs is described in the
hierarchy of paranoia developed by Freeman and colleagues. These authors propose five levels
of threat associated with increasing distress and disability: (i) social evaluative concerns (e.g.
fears of negative evaluation or rejection); (ii) ideas of reference (e.g. people talking about
you); and (iii) mild (e.g. people trying to irritate you); (iv) moderate (e.g. people going out
of their way to get at you); and (v) severe threat beliefs (e.g. people trying to cause you
significant harm) (Freeman et al., 2005). Consistent with the continuum model of psychosis
(e.g. Combs and Penn, 2004; Johns et al., 2004, Johns and van Os, 2001), this hierarchy spans
beliefs characteristic of social anxiety through to persecutory delusions, and assumes that
these delusions build on more common evaluative beliefs and ideas of reference likely to be
associated with social phobia.
This study investigates the lived experience of threat beliefs in social phobia and
persecutory delusions. In addition to the content of fears, we examined people’s responses
to being under threat both at the time and in hindsight. This included an assessment
of individuals’ metacognitive awareness of interpersonal threats, given the increasing
recognition of the importance of being able to stand back or “decentre” from internal
experience in mental health (see Teasdale et al., 2002; Wells, 2000).
Aims
This research examined the experience of being under threat in social phobia and paranoia.
It is likely that similar psychological processes maintain interpersonal threat beliefs in both
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Table 1. Participant demographics
Participant Group Age Gender Marital Status Treatment Status Employment
5 Social phobia 54 Male Divorced Outpatient Unemployed
6 Social phobia 31 Female Married No current treatment Employed
7 Social phobia 22 Female Single No current treatment Unemployed
8 Social phobia 26 Female Single No current treatment Employed
9 Social phobia 20 Male Single No current treatment Unemployed
10 Social phobia 26 Female Single Outpatient Employed
12 Social phobia 49 Female Married Outpatient Unemployed
13 Social phobia 58 Female Divorced No current treatment Employed
14 Social phobia 24 Female Single No current treatment Sick leave
1 Paranoia 29 Female Single Outpatient Unknown
2 Paranoia 38 Female Single Outpatient Unpaid work
3 Paranoia 50 Female Married Outpatient Unemployed
4 Paranoia 29 Male Single Outpatient Unemployed
11 Paranoia 38 Female Married Outpatient Unemployed
15 Paranoia 57 Male Single Outpatient Unemployed
16 Paranoia 44 Male Single Outpatient Unemployed
17 Paranoia 52 Male Divorced Outpatient Unemployed
18 Paranoia 34 Male Single No current treatment Unemployed
presentations, yet the nature and extent of the similarities and differences between the two are
not yet clearly understood.
This study aimed to contribute to the ongoing development of the respective clinical
cognitive models by examining threat experiences in people with social phobia and
persecutory delusions. A qualitative approach was used because the aim was to understand and
represent individuals’ experiences as they encounter, engage and live through these distressing




Participants with social phobia and persecutory delusions were recruited to this research,
and a linked study comparing these groups with clinical and non-clinical controls (Newman
Taylor and Stopa, 2012). The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I disorders
(First, Spitzer, Gibbons and Williams, 2001) was used to confirm DSM-IV diagnostic criteria.
Thirteen people met criteria for social phobia and 13 met criteria for schizophrenia (but not
social phobia), with persecutory delusions. Eight people then declined to be recorded during
interview, leaving a total of 9 people in each group, 18 in total. Eight of the 9 people with social
phobia had generalized type, one person had specific type (focused on just two situations).
The SCID indicated no comorbidity in these18. Participants were not matched. Demographic
characteristics are given in Table 1.
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Procedure
Participants were recruited through consultant psychiatrists on the basis of current diagnosis.
These individuals were then contacted by telephone, given information about the research,
and asked if they would like to participate. An assessment session was arranged at a
hospital setting where participants were given written information about the study and
asked to sign a consent form if willing to take part. The SCID overview (for patients)
and modules (psychosis screen/modules B and C, mood episodes and anxiety disorders)
were then completed to confirm diagnosis. Only the standard probes included in the SCID
were used. The semi-structured interview was completed (along with questionnaires for the
linked study) and audio-recorded for later analysis. All measures were administered by a
clinical psychologist or psychology assistant. A clinical psychologist who was experienced in
diagnosis and had experience of using the SCID in previous research studies trained the other
clinical psychologist and psychology assistants. This included instruction in use of the SCID,
observation of an experienced user, and then being observed in order to ensure effective use
of the tool.
Interview
The Cognitive Profiling Interview (CPI; Wells, 2000) was adapted for the purpose of the
present study. The CPI was developed to assess people’s responses and metacognitive
responses to distressing situations. Individuals are asked to describe a recent situation that
causes distress and is typical of their difficulties. The interviewer then prompts participants to
discuss the following aspects of their experience:
i) the nature of the distressing event;
ii) associated thoughts and feelings;
iii) focus of attention;
iv) reflections on the experience, looking back.
The interview consists of a standard set of questions and prompts. The semi-structured format
allows participants to expand on questions if relevant. Interviews lasted between 20 and 60
minutes, and were recorded with participants’ permission. The adapted measure is available
on request.
Analysis
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and underwent a detailed qualitative analysis. The
transcripts were analyzed following thematic methods (e.g. Braun and Clarke, 2006) in which
researchers immerse themselves in the data – reading and rereading the transcripts several
times to ensure familiarity and understanding. Through this process, key ideas emerged and
were discussed rigorously within the research team producing initial codes. Codes identified
across the data set were then honed into a clear set of prominent themes and subthemes.
Following best practice guidelines for qualitative analysis (Elliott et al., 1999), this stage was
supervised by another researcher to ensure clarity and consistency in themes elicited. The
transcripts were then reread against the themes to ensure reliability. Any themes that did not
appear frequently in the transcripts or among multiple participants were discarded. Themes
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Figure 1. Themes and subthemes drawn from the qualitative analysis
were then named and defined. A full codebook was compiled and is available on request. The
results were drawn from the codebook, and representative quotes illustrate each theme and
subtheme.
Results
Three major themes were identified through the thematic analysis. Participants discussed
their “experience of threat”, their “reactions” at the time of the threat, and their “reflections”
following the event or situation. Subthemes were identified within each major theme, and are
defined and illustrated below. In addition, an overarching category of “coherence” emerged
across the themes, reflecting the extent to which participants were able to communicate a
cogent and broadly consistent account of their experiences (see Figure 1).
Experience of threat
This main theme comprises people’s direct experiences of being under threat. This includes an
acute awareness of threat and desire for safety (threat and safety); people’s emotional, bodily
and perceptual sensations (affective, sensory and perceptual experience); and attentional
processes engaged while under threat (attentional processes).
Threat and safety. Participants described an acute awareness of current threat as a core
component of their experience. This was evident in most interviews and differed between the
social phobia and paranoia groups. People with social phobia reported a sense of imminent
danger and an urgent need to get to safety, rather than focusing on the source of threat or
feared consequences:
Researcher: Okay, okay so what’s going through your mind is “I’ve gotta get home”?
Participant 5 (SP): Yeah . . . I’m safe there.
Participant 13 (SP): Yes I just can’t think of anything I just want to go home, and sit on my own
at home.
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By contrast, people with paranoia focused more on being targeted and victimized by others.
For these participants the source of threat and feared consequences were highly salient and
often elaborated:
Researcher: And what did you, can you tell me more about this idea that people were coming at
you?
Participant 3 (Para): Well, it was just going outside and people were gonna be there waiting for
me . . . and they’re going to attack me and leave me sort of unconscious in the . . . on the road or
try and run me off the road with a car.
For some, the perceived danger was not of physical harm but instead of damage to their
reputation, or ridicule:
Participant 2 (Para): I thought they were talking about me in the other room . . . I thought he was
making plans to make me look stupid.
While all participants described their experience of being under threat, the desire to get to
safety was most salient for people with social phobia, and those with paranoia focused more
on the nature and consequences of the threat.
Affective, sensory and perceptual experience. Participants gave vivid descriptions of their
emotional, physical and perceptual experiences at the time of threat. These included memories
and images, as well as voices and visual hallucinations for people in the paranoia group.
Participants’ responses indicated a strong sense of being overwhelmed by their emotions:
Participant 12 (SP): The fears, they just take over, over.
Participant 3 (Para): I was just, I just felt totally terrified.
Individuals’ emotional reactions were typical of anxiety and fear; people reported feeling
“nervous” (Ppt. 5, SP), “anxious” (Ppt. 6, SP), “scared” (Ppt. 7, SP), “totally desperate” (Ppt.
3, Para) and “totally terrified” (Ppt. 3, Para). Similarly, both groups reported bodily sensations
associated with intense anxiety; “physically, I was shaken, palpitations, sweat” (Ppt. 7, SP),
“I’ll start stuttering” (Ppt. 5, SP), “breathing might come rapid and shallow” (Ppt. 2, Para) and
“can’t breathe properly, feel suffocated” (Ppt. 3, Para).
Interestingly, there were differences in the quality of memories and images reported from
the time of distress. People with social phobia often recalled particular memories that had
elicited similar fears, and clearly recalled these as past events:
Researcher: When you were thinking about the holiday did it bring up any memories?
Participant 6 (SP): . . . of when I’ve been on holidays before and when I’ve had to go on school
trips before, it all stems back to when I was small . . . I’ve never had a good memory of going out
for the day or going on a holiday.
Many in the paranoia group also identified memories or images linked to the threat situation,
but in contrast to the social phobia group, appeared to relive memories or experience the
images as reactivated; these participants described what they were seeing and feeling in
striking detail:
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Participant 11 (Para): Yeah, that’s why I cut myself because I kinda, I started to see ropes round
my wrists I started to see, if I tried to talk about anything I started to get the choking feeling . . . I
cut my stomach ‘cause I feel as though there’s something there, sort of lying there . . . I just want
to cut it away, get rid of it.
At times, it was unclear whether the person was describing vivid memories, images or
hallucinatory experiences; at times the distinction seemed to be unclear to participants as
well as the researchers.
Others in the paranoia group described images associated with delusional beliefs, for
example Participant 16 who believed that his father was living on the streets, and that his
ex-partner was being held and abused:
Researcher: And how vivid is the image that you’ve just described?
Participant 16 (Para): It usually, seems to be usually in black and white.
Researcher: Okay and that’s both the image of your father on the street in a tatty coat did you say?
Participant 16 (Para): Yes.
Researcher: And the bikers around him, is that right?
Participant 16 (Para): Yeah.
Researcher: And the other is of Sarah on the cross and being raped by, by the bikers?
Participant 16 (Para): Yeah, yeah I had all those images, a bit like a movie in my mind, yeah bit
like a, yeah.
The perceptual experiences for those with paranoia also included voices. Some voices gave
advice, others issued commands in threatening situations. One woman heard voices when a
number of boys were shouting and mocking her:
Participant 11 (Para): I start getting the voices and the voices coming on and they’re telling me
to harm him and do things to him.
Others were potentially comforting:
Participant 3 (Para): The voices were saying “don’t worry”, they were saying to me actually
“don’t worry she will get the time off”, but I, I wouldn’t even listening to them, I was so uptight in
myself.
Participant 3 (Para): Well they, they let me know who, who to be on guard against so if I’m
walking into Tesco’s and somebody’s coming at me, they’ll say “it’s alright, just keep walking,
look straight past them he’s gonna be alright” or “she’ll be alright” or they’ll say “be careful,
there’s a thing coming”, you know somebody with a, a threat, they’ll let me know.
Participant 17 described clear and distressing visual hallucinations in feared situations:
Participant 17 (Para): I was getting these hallucinations and these shadows and these frightening
demonic thoughts and things, people turning into demons.
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Participant 17 (Para): I think I mentioned that I was in the ward I saw all these, it wasn’t just
me that was evil, but I was like Satan, the lord of it all, but all the other patients were turning into
white devils as well at the same time.
In summary, all participants gave vivid descriptions of their emotional and bodily sensations
at the time of threat, and these were consistent with usual fear responses. The groups differed
in their perceptual experiences. People with paranoia reported voices and visual images, and
the distinction between memories and hallucinatory experiences was at times unclear.
Attentional processes. As part of the structured interview participants were asked
to comment on attentional processes in feared situations. This subtheme encompasses
participants’ experiences of self-consciousness, focus of attention and perspective taking at
the time of distress. Participants in both groups consistently reported feeling self-conscious
when under threat. Interestingly, when asked what they were paying most attention to in the
threat situation, participants focused both on themselves (as the object of threat), and on others
(as the source of threat):
Participant 13 (SP): I was just overwhelmed actually. . .Overwhelmed by all these people, which
of course I knew there were gonna be thousands of people anyways so, I it was no surprise really.
Participant 15 (Para): People in the streets.
Participant 7 (SP): Um, making sure I didn’t make eye contact with anyone . . .
Participant 2 (Para): And trying to keep my shaking under control, use all my tricks with steady
breathing, all that sort of thing.
In addition to self-consciousness and focus of attention, participants were asked about their
perspective taking. In both groups, some participants reported experiences from an observer
perspective (as if watching themselves from the outside), and others described events or
memories from a field perspective (from behind their own eyes). Furthermore, those taking an
observer perspective varied in terms of whether this was imagined from another individual’s
perspective or from a wider “bird’s eye view”, as if looking on the scene from above. Perhaps
most interestingly, the perspective taken by participants from both groups often varied or
switched between observer and field perspectives over periods of distress.
Two people in the paranoia group described possible dissociative processes when their
distress was most intense. For example, Participant 3 described this process as if she existed
in another place or time, which prevented her from being actively involved in what was
happening:
Participant 3 (Para): I’m not aware I’ve done it, I’m not, I am aware I’m doing it, but I don’t, it’s
like being in a different sort of time lock. I suddenly, I suddenly click back and think [sigh] “oh
dear” . . .
In summary, participants’ focus of attention was complex and varied over time. People in
both groups reported strong feelings of self-consciousness. They focused both on the source
of perceived danger and themselves as the object of threat. Many described both observer
and field perspectives, with their perspective changing over time. Two of the paranoia group
reported dissociating from the experience when most distressed.
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Reaction
This second major theme incorporates participants’ reactions to distressing situations or
events, and includes the person’s patterns of thinking, and the internal resources activated
to manage their experience. This theme includes the subthemes of “trapped in thinking” and
“control and escape”.
Trapped in thinking. This theme describes participants’ accounts of the intrusive,
compelling and seemingly inescapable streams of thought experienced during times of
distress. For many the threat triggered cyclical patterns of thinking in which they felt trapped
and stuck:
Participant 8 (SP): I can’t stop thinking about it. It’s like I can’t shut off . . . I’ve got it on my
mind all the time.
Participant 03 (Para): . . . I’m just thinking about it constantly . . . I can’t put my mind onto things
I want to think about, I just think about that all the time.
Participant 3 (Para): Umm, I just quite worry, I was anxious and I thought the bus driver was
looking at me through the mirror to see I was, I was behaving, people around me were aware of it
and um, I felt, I was being watched you know and the more I think I’m being watched the worse,
the worse it gets.
Many also described feeling overwhelmed by the speed with which their thoughts came to
mind:
Participant 10 (SP): And I just get really like, thoughts just come into my head really, really
quickly and I don’t get time to order them at all.
Participant 2 (Para): . . .your thoughts are racing. . .
Participants in both groups reported streams of thought that were intrusive and overwhelming,
and a powerful sense of being trapped in these internal patterns.
Control and escape. Participants described a range of coping behaviours initiated in
response to the threat, including attempts to avoid, escape or control the experience. People in
both groups used behavioural and more subtle ways of removing themselves from threatening
situations:
Researcher: Okay, what did you want to do in the situation?
Participant 12 (SP): Not to come. . .Just to cancel it all to avoid the situation.
Participant 5 (SP): That’s what I mean, I get home as quick as I can ‘cause it’s, it’s, it’s I don’t
know what might happen, as I said, I play it safe, for me.
Participant 03 (Para): Uh, wear a pair of sunglasses and hide away.
Participant 7 (SP): Yes, yeah I suppose it’s like going into a shell, just I don’t say anything, I
don’t do anything, I just remove myself from the situation.
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For others, the only way to cope was to take medication:
Participant 15 (Para): . . .for example, only last week when I went to town and uh, went to B–
town and um, in the end I went, I went somewhere quiet and took haloperidol to calm me down a
bit.
Some managed to remain in the situation by using distraction or other coping skills:
Participant 14 (SP): I do a crossword or something just so that I’m thinking of other things, trying
to take my mind off. . .
Participant 18 (Para): No, I tried to use all the skills I have to sort of um calm myself and be
optimistic um and I was looking to the future and thinking well if I don’t make it I can also go er
on a later flight.
For all participants the perception of threat initiated behavioural or internal responses to
manage their fears.
Reflection
The third major theme incorporates individuals’ responses to being under intense threat, after
the immediate danger has passed. Three sub-themes of “lost or decentred”, “judgements of
self” and “parallel understanding” emerged.
Lost or decentred. A clear distinction emerged between the groups in their ability to
distance themselves from the experience of threat, following the event. Away from the
perceived source of threat, most people with social phobia were able to “step back” from
the experience, cope more effectively once more, and review recent appraisals of danger:
Participant 4 (SP): Umm, [sigh] once I’m out of the situation I um, tend to not let, not think about
it, it’s over and done with and, and just carry on with whatever’s going on.
Participant 13 (SP): Yeah, looking back on it, but I’m looking back on it from a calm point of
view, at the time it was awful and now it was ridiculous . . .
Researcher: . . . do you think it could possibly be a distortion?
Participant 8 (SP): Distortion definitely yeah, no I don’t think he was thinking bad of me but
that’s just what’s in my head.
The contrast with people with paranoia was striking. The majority of people in this group
were unable to distance themselves from the experience of being under threat, and continued
to report intense and overwhelming affect regarding the event, despite recognizing that it was
no longer happening:
Researcher: So even though you’re not in that situation, just thinking about it. . .
Participant 3 (Para): Looking back. . .
Researcher: Makes you feel very upset?
Participant 3 (Para): Yeah.
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Participant 3 (Para): It is extremely overwhelming.
Researcher: Even looking back?
Participant 3 (Para): Yes, yeah.
Researcher: Mmm hmm, and now looking back do you accept those thoughts and judgements as
facts based in reality, do they seem to be. . .
Participant 15 (Para): They’re real, yeah they’re real thoughts yeah.
Researcher: . . .do they still seem to overwhelm you?
Participant 14 (Para): They do but not as much as what they did at the time, but they still do.
Judgements of self. Self-criticism and perceived criticism from others was common when
participants reflected on their experiences of threat. Participants in both groups became highly
critical of themselves, describing themselves as “stupid” (Ppt. 6, SP; Ppt. 9, SP), “not normal”
(Ppt. 8, SP), “pathetic” (Ppt. 10, SP), “quite inadequate” (Ppt. 2, Para) and “utterly evil”
(Ppt. 17, Para). Most believed that others perceived them similarly: “just obviously thinking I
wasn’t normal” (Ppt. 8, SP), “like just proves everybody else right, that I am stupid” (Ppt. 2,
Para); “I said ‘hello’, they just completely ignored me, or they um, give me a filthy look, as
though I’m scum of the earth sort of thing” (Ppt. 17, Para). Many openly berated themselves
for their fears and responses:
Participant 10 (SP): And I thought that everybody else is normal and I’m not and I’m making it
worse for myself ‘cause I’m just having all these like, stupid thoughts.
Participant 2 (Para): Yeah, no stupid that I have the worries, I have the worries and they prove
me to be stupid so it’s not that I’m stupid mmm, mmm, getting a bit confused . . . umm, I don’t,
I’m stupid to have the thoughts ‘cause I know they’re there and I can’t help them being there.
Although there were similarities between the groups in their self judgements, a number
of those with paranoia reported extreme appraisals that may be associated with more
fundamental beliefs about being bad:
Participant 11 (Para): I’m gonna let all the dirt and the filth out and what I was going – what I’ve
been through an’ ‘cause you, uh well I do, I I I feel very dirty inside.
Participant 17 (Para): I mean, I, as you know I tend to think that people think I’m evil anyway.
Participant 17 (Para): . . . or I’m perverted or disgusting, filthy, all these things, smelly,
revolting. . .
Parallel understanding or “minding the gap”. It became clear that participants were
able to hold their own beliefs about specific threats while simultaneously recognizing that
others were likely to appraise their situation differently. Not only were people aware of this
difference, it compounded their distress in two ways. First, this “parallel understanding”
appeared to have a profound impact on how isolated people felt from those around them,
and contributed to an awareness of their own difference from a desired normality.
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Participant 3 (para): I just sort of, wh-when it happens I just think why does it always happen to
me? Why can’t I just do something like normal people do, you know why is it I just can’t go book
a holiday? Why is there always, always problems and, you know?
Participant 6 (SP): I know that in everyone else’s life they don’t act like me.
Participant 6 (SP): . . . so it just makes me feel lonely, like on my own, that there’s no one – no
one else understands.
Second, some people in the paranoia group struggled to judge the reality of their beliefs,
given the discrepancy between these and others’ likely appraisals, and so doubted their own
thinking.
Participant 16 (Para): . . .wondering why I’ve got these ideas, and why I’ve got these ideas and
are they real or not and to be quite honest with you, a lot of the time I can’t tell whether it’s real
or not, and um, you know, I just sort of wonder where the ideas come from if they’re not real or if
they’re not real then they’re just sort of, I dunno, I can’t, can’t tell.
Participant 17 (Para): . . .but when I’m, when I’m ill, you don’t, you just accept, accept what you
hear and what you think as, as real. No matter if it’s complete rubbish, you just think it’s true. . .
Participant 4 (Para): Um, I, I try and tell myself that I’m just being paranoid, um, and that they’re
not really talking about me, um, but I still get the feeling that they are, even though I try to tell
myself that they’re not.
For both groups, the ability to recognize the difference between their beliefs and others’
likely appraisals was linked to “judgements of self”; people were critical of their perceived
inability to be normal, and both recognized and certainly “minded the gap”; participant 5 (SP)
repeatedly asked the interviewer “does it sound daft?”
Coherence
A lack of narrative coherence was evident in many of the interviews in the paranoia group.
This describes the extent to which participants were able to communicate a cogent and broadly
consistent account of their experiences. At times, those in the paranoia group struggled to
respond directly and with clarity to questions asked, and their responses became fragmented
and confused. This superordinate theme emerged across all three of the major categories.
Researcher: Did you have any memories coming up into your mind on that occasion?
Participant 3 (Para): Uh well, I, I do, do that all the time I try to um, I try to, I sort of said when I
saw K- I try to control my symptoms which is try not to look like I’m looking at people and things
and of course it doesn’t work it just makes it worse so. . .what was the question?
Participant 11 (Para): Well hopefully I’ve been taught different strategies to cope so, um, I think
if, if I’d been taught how to cope, obviously being in and out of hospital, I think I’d be ab- I, that
think that situation wouldn’t have happened.
For some, when asked how they viewed their beliefs in hindsight, the interviewer understood
the general gist of their responses, but struggled to understand these precisely:
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Participant 3 (Para): No fears I can, hundreds of times I can go back to, it’s fear its um, just a
real live fear.
Participant 16 (Para): Yeah, I mean, even if it was real it’s distorted as well, you know, it can be
distorted reality, I suppose that’s what I mean.
Participant 9 (SP): Just tell yourself, not not doin anything wrong, and then you gotta think not
all the time, that something can’t be wrong all the time can ya?
This lack of coherence was not evident in the social phobia group, who were able to describe
and reflect on their experiences of threat, and clarify any lack of understanding about questions
with the interviewer.
Discussion and conclusions
Social phobia and paranoia are characterized by interpersonal threat beliefs, and the cognitive
models indicate that similar psychological processes contribute to the maintenance of distress
in both. Clinically, we can usually distinguish the two, but the similarities and differences in
the experience and maintenance of threat in these groups are not yet fully understood.
This research examined the experience of threat in people with social phobia and others
with persecutory delusions. This was in order to understand more fully the processes involved
in the threat experience, in turn to inform clinical formulation and interventions aimed at
reducing distress and disability.
Summary and discussion of findings
Three major themes emerged from the data: participants described their “experience of
threat”, their “reactions” at the time of threat, and their subsequent “reflections”. These themes
are unsurprising given the structure of the interview (see description above). Within each of
these, subthemes emerged that indicate particular similarities and differences in psychological
processes between the two groups.
Experience of threat
The experience of “threat and safety” was communicated forcefully by all participants.
People with social phobia described a sense of imminent danger and corresponding desire
for immediate safety. Those in the paranoia group also described a powerful sense of threat
(cf Abba, Chadwick and Stevenson, 2008), yet focused more on the nature and feared
consequences of the threat, often elaborating these in some detail for the interviewer. The
tendency to develop elaborate constructions around their fears is not unusual in people with
psychosis; clinically we know that people often describe complex (if not necessarily internally
consistent) belief systems.
The second subtheme incorporated “affective, sensory and perceptual experience”.
Participants in both groups gave vivid descriptions of emotional and bodily sensations
typically associated with severe anxiety. Differences emerged in participants’ perceptual
experiences, with some people in the paranoia group reporting hallucinations. In a non-
clinical study of the differences between social anxiety and paranoia, perceptual anomalies
202 L. Stopa et al.
distinguished risk of paranoid reactions from risk of social anxiety, while measures of mood
and cognition were similar (Freeman et al., 2008). The present findings are consistent with
this, indicating that perceptual rather than affective responses differ between the groups,
and that this is the case for clinical as well as non-clinical populations. In addition, the
distinction between memories and hallucinatory experiences was at times unclear to people
in the paranoia group; it may be that this is linked to their metacognitive skills, as discussed
below.
The “attentional processing” subtheme was particularly interesting, and revealed a more
complex picture than current cognitive models suggest. People in both groups reported strong
feelings of self-consciousness in line with previous findings. When asked about their focus
of attention, participants with social phobia and those with paranoia described attending both
to others (as the source of perceived danger) and themselves (as the object of threat). This
would indicate a more dynamic attentional focus than predicted by current theories, and may
explain apparent discrepancies between models of social phobia that posit internal (e.g. Clark
and Wells, 1995) and external (e.g. Rapee and Heimberg, 1997) focus of attention.
In addition, people in the two groups described both observer and field perspectives, with
these perspectives changing over time. The Clark and Wells (1995) model suggests that people
with social phobia adopt an observer perspective at times of interpersonal threat. Whilst
this was supported by the present study, the results again indicate a more fluid process in
which people may move between field and observer perspectives. Furthermore, it may be
that the observer perspective itself is more complex than originally thought. Some people
described seeing the threat situation from another person’s view point and others from a wider
“bird’s eye view”. If replicated, these findings suggest that cognitive models of social phobia
and paranoia may need to be adapted to allow for this complexity in attentional focus and
perspective taking, and that clinicians should assess these processes carefully in therapeutic
work.
Reaction
Participants’ reactions to the experience of threat were typical of fear responses and
comparable across the two groups. Participants reported compelling, often racing streams
of thought, and a clear sense of being trapped in these internal events. All participants
attempted to manage the threat, and initiated coping behaviours ranging from attempts to
control, escape or avoid the danger. These findings are consistent with the respective cognitive
models that propose a range of cognitive and behavioural responses to manage interpersonal
fears. Clark and Wells (1995) emphasize disconfirmatory processes in the maintenance of
social phobia, while Freeman and colleagues (Freeman et al., 2002) posit both confirmatory
and disconfirmatory processes in their model of paranoia. The participants interviewed for the
present study emphasized reactions likely to maintain distress by preventing disconfirmation
of beliefs (typically through behavioural or more subtle forms of avoidance) rather than
confirmatory processes.
Reflection
The third subtheme “lost or decentred” clearly distinguished the two groups. Looking back on
threat situations, most people with social phobia were able to “step back” or “decentre” from
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the event, and review earlier appraisals of danger. By contrast, those with paranoia were unable
to distance themselves in this way, and continued to report affect and cognition associated with
an expectation of current danger.
Drawing on a combination of recent cognitive theory and Buddhist approaches to
psychological distress, Teasdale and colleagues conceptualize the ability to decentre from
internal experience as “metacognitive awareness”, defined as “a cognitive set in which
negative thoughts/feelings are experienced as mental events, rather than as the self”
(Teasdale et al., 2002, p. 275). In a rigorous study of the role of this skill in people
with residual depression, these authors found that poor metacognitive awareness was
associated with vulnerability to relapse. Furthermore, metacognitive awareness increased in
those participants with reduced relapse rates following psychological intervention (for both
cognitive therapy and mindfulness based cognitive therapy). Teasdale and colleagues conclude
that metacognitive awareness may be the key process of psychological change in the groups
studied (Teasdale et al., 2002).
It is of note that participants in both the social anxiety and paranoia groups described a
powerful sense of being overwhelmed and trapped at the time of interpersonal threat. Our
results suggest that people with social phobia were able to decentre from these thoughts and
feelings following the event, whereas those in the paranoia group showed poor metacognitive
awareness, even looking back on the situation. This raises the interesting and important
question of whether people with persecutory delusions have poor metacognitive awareness
not only at times of distress, but subsequent to the immediate threat. The clinical implications
are potentially considerable, and the hypothesis certainly requires further examination. Insofar
as the ability to decentre from internal experience is likely to facilitate accurate identification
of memories and current perceptual experiences, poor metacognitive awareness might also
be linked to participants’ inability to distinguish memories from hallucinatory experiences
reliably.
In their “judgements of self” both groups reported problematic self appraisals, consistent
with the cognitive models of social phobia and paranoia. There was some indication that
participants in the paranoia group reported particularly extreme descriptions of the self (as
evil and revolting, for example). Whether these beliefs were held at the level of automatic
thoughts or at a more fundamental core belief level, was not assessed. Judgements of self
certainly appear to be a key component in the threat experience of both groups, and are likely
to require careful consideration in any psychological work.
The final subtheme in this section described participants’ ability to hold their own
threat beliefs alongside a recognition that others were likely to appraise the same situation
differently. This “parallel understanding” is relevant in therapeutic work (particularly at
formulation) when people are invited to consider alternative and historical explanations for
current beliefs and distress. The fact that people with persecutory delusions also showed this
parallel understanding is interesting when considered in combination with the hypothesis that
these individuals may struggle to decentre from their internal experience, even in retrospect.
In their work with people with psychosis, Garety and colleagues have discussed the “response
to hypothetical contradiction” (e.g. Garety and Hemsley, 1994) as a useful tool in assessing
how likely it is that someone would countenance an alternative explanation for their psychotic
experiences. The current findings suggest that people with persecutory delusions are able
to hold alternative explanations in mind, but may struggle to decentre from the threat
beliefs.
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Coherence
Finally, a lack of narrative coherence was evident in many of the interviews with participants
in the paranoia group. In their important work on recovery and relapse prevention in psychosis,
Gumley and Schwannauer (2006) note that the discourse of people with psychosis can
become fragmented and impoverished, and suggest that this indicates traumatic or unresolved
experiences. Following Greenburg and colleagues (Greenberg, Rice and Elliott, 1993) and
Siegel (1999), these authors argue that the development of a coherent narrative linking the
person’s past, present and future, with their construction of self, and accommodating the
compelling and pervasive emotional experiences of psychosis, is a key task in therapy. The
present research is consistent with the suggestion that coherence of narrative is problematic
for many people with persecutory delusions.
Limitations
Participants were not matched for age or gender. The findings are also limited by the lack of
information on participants’ mental state and medication use. The majority of people in the
paranoia group were in receipt of outpatient care, and the majority of the social anxiety group
were not receiving treatment at the time of the study. It may be that, overall, participants in
the paranoia group were more unwell and taking more medication than those in the social
anxiety group, and this may have affected the results, having an impact on coherence, for
example.
Notwithstanding these limitations, theoretical and clinical implications may be drawn from
this research. The study raises rather than answers questions. Interesting and potentially
important hypotheses regarding attentional processes and metacognitive awareness can be
formulated, and these will require further, possibly mixed methods analysis.
Theoretical and clinical implications
Recognizing the compelling and pervasive experience of interpersonal threat. All participants
gave vivid and compelling descriptions of their experience of interpersonal threat. This
study yielded a rich sense of these experiences, typical of qualitative studies. If we are to
recognize and validate these experiences in our clinical work we need to emphasize the
Rogerian skills of empathy, warmth and genuine regard, communicated through active and
patient listening. These skills are perhaps easier said than done in the modern NHS in which
economic constraints and contractual arrangements based on clinical contacts encourage short
term work and early discharge. It is of note that certain authors focusing on the detail of
therapeutic work with people with psychosis (Chadwick, 2006; Gumley and Schwannauer,
2006) suggest the use of formulation and ending letters as a way of validating and conveying
the therapist’s understanding of the person’s lived experience (as well as perhaps aiding
coherence of narrative or metacognitive awareness).
The role of formulation. Highly critical judgements of the self emerged as a key component
in individuals’ threat experiences. In addition to validating the person’s sense of immediate
and overwhelming threat (described above), it is likely that a recognition of the gravity of
these appraisals needs to be communicated in therapeutic work. The model of social phobia
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(Clark and Wells, 1995) places “processing of the self as a social object” at the centre of
the formulation. This represents the person’s “felt sense”, and incorporates key judgements
of the self, often in the form of an image. Given the present findings, it may be that a
comparable representation would be valuable in models of paranoia, and indicate linked
interventions.
Arguably, CBT and other formulation based approaches, rely on a person’s ability to
consider alternative explanations of current distress (in the form of the case conceptualization)
and then be able to decentre from immediate internal experience. If the abilities to (i) hold
“parallel understandings” of threat events, and (ii) develop a metacognitive or decentred
awareness of internal experience, are necessary to therapeutic change, it would be valuable
to name these processes in the formulation. The current findings suggest that people with
persecutory delusions may be able to hold alternative explanations in mind, but struggle to
decentre from their internal experience, even after the event. It is likely that these processes
could be incorporated into “processing of the self” representations and provide the rationale
to develop people’s skills in decentred awareness where this is problematic, for people with
persecutory delusions as well as in social anxiety.
Gumley and Schwannauer (2006) argue that a key task in therapy is the development
of a coherent narrative. Traditional CBT certainly aims to make links between a person’s
past, present and future, incorporating the current experience of mental distress. The work of
these authors emphasize the “process” of formulation, however, linking this explicitly to the
construction of self, and the role of conceptualization in supporting narrative coherence. This
is likely to take time. It may be that formulation is more usefully understood as a stage of
therapy, with linked goals of developing coherent narrative and recognizing the psychological
processes maintaining distress in situ, particularly for people with poor metacognitive
awareness. Further research is now needed to work out how best to conceptualize these
processes within the formulation, and then to examine the impact of interventions aimed at
improving decentred awareness and narrative coherence.
Assessment of attentional processes. The “attentional processing” subtheme revealed a
complex picture for both social phobia and paranoia participants. In addition to intense
feelings of self-consciousness, participants described a fluid focus of attention, moving
between themselves (as the object of threat) and others (as the source of perceived danger).
Many also described fluidity in their adoption of observer and field perspectives. This has
implications for the cognitive models of social phobia and paranoia, which may need to be
adapted to allow for this complexity in attentional focus and perspective taking. Detailed
examination of attentional processes over periods of distress, using measures that allow for
change over short periods of time, is now required to elucidate these processes more fully.
Experimental research has long since highlighted the role of attentional processes
in psychopathology (e.g. Bogels and Mansell, 2004); however, these studies often lack
ecological validity and their findings may not to be incorporated into routine clinical work. As
clinicians, we now need to assess attentional processes (specifically self-consciousness, focus
of attention and perspective taking) and name these within psychological formulation if we
are to work more effectively with our patients.
The role of metacognition. This study suggests that people with persecutory delusions may
have poor metacognitive awareness, both at times of interpersonal threat and in retrospect.
If Teasdale and colleagues are correct, that metacognitive awareness mediates therapeutic
benefit in cognitive behavioural interventions (Teasdale et al., 2002), this process or skill
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requires further investigation in this group. The lack of narrative coherence in the paranoia
participants in this study, and the emphasis placed on addressing this in the clinical literature
(Gumley and Schwannauer, 2006), may also reflect a tendency to poor metacognitive
awareness in this group, and the need to address this if therapeutic work is to be effective.
It is probably fair to say that CBT interventions for people with paranoia are not yet as
efficacious as those for other problems such as social phobia. If effective CBT involves the
ability to decentre from distressing experience, and people with persecutory delusions struggle
with this to a greater degree that people with problems traditionally termed “neuroses”,
it is likely that we need to pay far greater attention to this process in clinical work. As
suggested above, the clinical implications might include assessing and naming the process
in individuals’ formulation, and assisting the development of this skill before engaging in
change based interventions such as cognitive re-evaluation work or graded exposure to feared
situations.
Summary
This study aimed to examine the psychological processes associated with interpersonal threat
in people with social phobia and others with persecutory delusions. This is important because
psychological interventions depend on clear and accurate formulation of distress, and so a
detailed understanding of these processes is essential to effective therapeutic work.
The accounts of interpersonal threat experiences examined using qualitative thematic
analysis yielded three major themes: participants’ “experience of threat”, “reactions” while
under threat, and subsequent “reflections”, as well as the superordinate theme of “narrative
coherence”. Typical fear responses were found in both groups, particularly in their reactions to
threat, and key differences emerged between the groups in their perceptual experiences, ability
to stand back from the threat following the event, and narrative coherence. These findings
partially support the current cognitive models of social phobia and paranoia, and indicate areas
for further development, particularly in terms of formulating attentional and metacognitive
processes, in order to understand interpersonal threat experiences in these groups, and thus
develop more effective means of alleviating associated distress.
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